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The contamination of Japan after the Fukushima accident has been investigated mainly for volatile fission
products, but only sparsely for actinides such as plutonium. Only small releases of actinides were estimated
in Fukushima. Plutonium is still omnipresent in the environment from previous atmospheric nuclear
weapons tests. We investigated soil and plants sampled at different hot spots in Japan, searching for
reactor-borne plutonium using its isotopic ratio 240Pu/239Pu. By using accelerator mass spectrometry, we
clearly demonstrated the release of Pu from the Fukushima Daiichi power plant: While most samples
contained only the radionuclide signature of fallout plutonium, there is at least one vegetation sample whose
isotope ratio (0.381 6 0.046) evidences that the Pu originates from a nuclear reactor (2391240Pu activity
concentration 0.49 Bq/kg). Plutonium content and isotope ratios differ considerably even for very close
sampling locations, e.g. the soil and the plants growing on it. This strong localization indicates a particulate
Pu release, which is of high radiological risk if incorporated.
T
he accident at the FukushimaDaiichi nuclear power plant (FDNPP) in 2011 causedmassive contaminations
of the Japanese land surface and the Pacific Ocean with mainly volatile fission products. In the course of the
venting operations large amounts of radionuclides escaped from the reactor pressure vessels. The release was
enhanced by three massive hydrogen explosions that occurred in Units 1, 3 and 4. In the course of the accident,
large areas in Japan were contaminated with 131I, 132Te, 134Cs, 137Cs and other volatile radionuclides1–4. Numerous
studies revealed these airborne radionuclides in the entire northern hemisphere. Radioisotopes of refractory
elements such as strontium5–7, barium, and lanthanides were monitored only in rare occasions8. Actinides,
however, proved to be the most severely understudied group of elements, despite the fact that many of them
are long-lived a-emitters: most importantly 239Pu (half-life 24,110 y) and 240Pu (half-life 6,561 y). Schwantes et
al.9 estimated releases of only 0.002% (60.003%) of the overall plutonium inventory (.5.6 kg in units 1 and 3)9
into the environment. Recent analyses by Zheng et al. indicated even lower plutonium releases of only 0.00002%
of the core inventories10. Only few studies targeted the monitoring of actinides (most importantly plutonium) in
environmental media (including ocean and river water)7,11–15.Most profound evidence for atmospheric releases of
plutonium from Fukushima was presented in the study by Zheng et al.11.
Since the atmospheric nuclear weapon tests of the 20th century, plutonium has become a ubiquitous element in
the environment. However, using the atomic ratio 240Pu/239Pu as an isotopic signature, it is possible to distinguish
between the weapons’ fallout (240Pu/239Pu ca. 0.18)16 and plutonium releases from a nuclear reactor (240Pu/239Pu ca.
0.4–0.6). Due to the nuclides’ very similar a-particle energies, radioanalytical methods can usually not be used to
distinguish the isotopic ratios between 239Pu and 240Pu. Instead, low-ionization MS techniques17,18 or accelerator
mass spectrometry (AMS) have established as powerful alternatives. AMS is currently regarded as the most
sensitive method for the determination of the isotopic composition of environmental plutonium.
Previous indications for the release of actinides from Fukushima, in particular environmental abundance of
239Np (the parent nuclide of 239Pu), were presented by Shozugawa et al.19. In that study, 239Np was detected using
gamma spectrometry. Spectral overlap of themost intense peak of 239Np with the fission product 129mTe, however,
made it necessary to investigate both soil and vegetation samples from selected hot spots in the present study
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Results
Soil and vegetation samples taken from several Japanese hot spots in
2011 (Fig. 1 and Table 1) were investigated with special focus on
anthropogenic actinides, in particular plutonium.
The a-spectrometric and AMS results with respect to the atom
ratios 240Pu/239Pu as well as detectable activity concentrations of 239Pu
and 240Pu of soil and plant samples are listed in Table 2. Just in a few
samples, plutonium could be detected using a-spectrometry. Also,
for most samples, AMS revealed no detectable amounts of plu-
tonium. For signals below the decision threshold (according to ISO
11929)20 only an upper limit for the 240Pu/239Pu ratio is given. If 239Pu
was above the decision threshold, but 240Pu was not, an upper limit
for the atomic ratio is given. If neither of the isotopes could be
detected by AMS the respective table entry reads ‘‘n.d’’ (not
detected). The small amounts available did not allow for splitting
of the samples and hence a 242Pu spike concentration was added
forming a compromise between high alpha-activity required by
alpha spectroscopy and low atom-concentration desirable for AMS
measurements. Hence, AMS results of the present work suffer from a
very high background count rate.
Soil sample H-S2 revealed a 240Pu/239Pu ratio and AMS signal
strength characteristic for global fallout; hence no quantification
was undertaken for this sample. However, vegetation sample, A-V
revealed a significantly higher 240Pu/239Pu atomic ratio (0.381 6
0.046). With a much higher analytical uncertainty, sample G-V also
may carry an isotopic signature (0.64 6 0.37) that is higher than the
omnipresent fallout from the nuclear weapons tests. Such high ratios
are characteristic for nuclear reactor plutonium and hence evidence
the release of small but detectable amounts of plutonium from the
damaged reactors of FDNPP.
Discussion
Of 20 samples investigated in this study, 17 did not exceed the detec-
tion limit for plutonium. One soil sample was contaminated only by
global fallout plutonium with its characteristic isotopic ratio of
240Pu/239Pu , 0.2. However, at least one (A-V) or two (G-V; higher
uncertainty) of the vegetation samples showed detectable amounts of
reactor derived plutonium (isotopic ratio 240Pu/239Pu. 0.2). One can
assume that the ubiquitous fallout plutonium background masked
the minute contribution of Fukushima-derived plutonium in soil, as
illustrated by Zheng et al.11 However, given the low mobility and
bioavailability of plutonium, one can expect that plant uptake of
fallout plutonium will be negligible. Consequently, dry or wet depos-
ition of airborne plutonium on the surface of the plants will be highly
visible for sensitive analytical techniques such as AMS. This probably
explains why plants proved to be such suitable bioindicators for
airborne plutonium from Fukushima in the present study.
It is remarkable to note that distance alone is no sufficient factor to
estimate the findings of refractory elements such as plutonium.
Although the vegetation sample taken closest to the reactors
(,0.9 km away) exhibited detectable amounts of reactor-plutonium,
no other sample in close vicinity of the reactors (1.5, 1.9,… km away)
did so. However, a plant sample as far as 16 km away in north-
northwestern direction (G-V) is suspected to contain plutonium
fromFukushima. If this observationwas confirmed, it would indicate
a very nonuniform distribution of plutonium, most probably in par-
ticulate form. This may also have health physical implications
because the inhalation of such plutonium-rich particles may result
in high local dose delivery to the lung tissue.
There is common agreement among the scientific community that
only minute amounts of actinides have been released in the course of
the Fukushima nuclear accident. Schwantes et al.9 calculated the
average activity inventories of Units 1 and 3, from which a
240Pu/239Pu atomic ratio of 0.441 can be derived. A similar value
can be derived from the activity inventory data published by
Kirchner et al.21, in particular 0.393. Sakaguchi et al.12 estimated
the ratio tomore than 0.4. All these predicted, calculated or estimated
values are in good agreement with the ratio observed in sample A-V
(0.381 6 0.046) and also within the analytical uncertainty observed
in G-V (0.64 6 0.37). Zheng et al. observed somewhat lower values
for soil and litter11 (between 0.30 and 0.33) and concluded that mix-
ing with global fallout plutonium shifted the ratio to lower numbers.
However, the actual composition of a particle also can vary from
average activity inventory of an entire reactor, depending on its
nuclear ‘‘history’’21. Also some deviations between uranium-oper-
ated Unit 1 and MOX-operated Unit 3 can be expected. Sakaguchi
et al. found an increased 240Pu/239Pu isotopic ratio (0.308 6 0.176) in
water from Abukuma River, which fostered the need for further
analysis due to relatively large analytical uncertainties.
In any case, the sector field ICP-MS used by Zheng et al. proved to
produce results for the isotopic ratio that are quite comparable with
AMS of this study. The absolute activity concentrations for 2391240Pu
are also comparable to previously published data11,13, only slightly
higher. These values, however, are still within the range of plutonium
concentrations found before the Fukushima nuclear accident (0.15–
4.31 mBq/g)11,22. The sum activity of 2391240Pu alone, therefore, pro-
vides no sufficient evidence for plutonium releases from FDNPP.
In this context, it is interesting to note that only vegetation samples
but none of the soil samples exhibited detectable traces of reactor
plutonium. Since the Fukushima nuclear accident seemingly did not
significantly increase the environmental plutonium inventory, one
can hypothesize that the global plutonium background in soil dilutes
the isotopic ratio and blurs the characteristic isotopic fingerprint of
much smaller amounts of freshly deposited plutonium particles.
Given the low environmental mobility and bioavailability of plu-
tonium, vegetation collects airborne particles on its surface with a
negligible background due to ‘‘old’’ plutonium uptake. Future find-
ings of plutonium particles on plant material are increasingly
unlikely, because not only atmospheric releases of actinides have
ceased since 2011, but also rainfall will have washed down particles
from the plant surface or vegetation cycles will probably have
renewed the exposed leaf surface. In any case, the plutonium activ-
ities found in the vegetation samples (grass, leaves) sampled in late
2011 were (already?) so low that, assuming they were agricultural
plants, the plutonium activity concentrations would not have
exceeded any of the early regulatory limits for a-emitting radionu-
clides (actinides) in food23.
The results of this study confirm the very low release of refractory
elements from the Fukushima reactors. The plutonium concentra-
tions found herein and reported by Zheng et al.11 are partly more















Figure 1 | Locations of FukushimaDaiichi nuclear power plant (FDNPP)
and samples of this study using the codes of Table 1.
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environmental samples around the Chernobyl site after 198624. This
is also true for the semi-volatile radionuclide 90Sr that has been mon-
itored only occasionally after the Fukushima accident and revealed
relatively low activity concentrations in environmental samples in
Japan. As described in a previous study6, a vegetation sample from
spot G (a spot that is also suspected to be contaminated with reactor
plutonium according to Table 2) also carried a comparatively high
90Sr contamination, but a rather low radiocesium activity concentra-
tion (activity ratio 90Sr/137Cs approximately 0.1). This 90Sr over 137Cs
activity ratio was found to bemuch smaller with all the other samples
investigated in the previous study6. Spot G is located outside themain
‘‘contamination strip’’ that goes from the reactor in northwestern
direction, whichmakes the presence of reactor plutonium evenmore
unexpected. If the findings of reactor plutonium at spot G are con-
firmed, one may speculate what the reason for this unusual radio-
nuclide pattern is (high concentrations of refractory radionuclides,
but relatively low in volatile radionuclides). One possible explanation
could be that this spot was contaminated with fuel particles that have
experienced temperatures high enough to volatilize most of their
radiocesium content, before or while they were emitted from the
reactors. However, this hypothesis needs further investigations. In
any case, it seems that there is not necessarily a correlation between
the levels of radiocesium (and other volatile radionuclides) and the
presence of reactor plutonium in the environment. This observation
makes it likely that the release of plutonium was a more singular
event, whereas the volatile radionuclides were released from the
pressure vessels over several days in the course of the early venting
operations.
In summary, our study evidenced the release of plutonium from
the damaged FDNPP via its isotopic fingerprint. Two vegetation
samples exhibited 240Pu/239Pu isotopic ratios of 0.381 6 0.046 and
0.64 6 0.37, respectively, both of which are higher than the global
fallout background. The 2391240Pu activity concentrations, however,
were relatively low (0.49 and 0.17 Bq?kg21, respectively), confirming
early predictions of a low plutonium release from Fukushima. The
fact that reactor plutonium has not been found in more than two
samples (one of which remains more in question) indicates that
plutonium releases and fallout from FDNPP occurred in the form
of particulates causing nonuniform plutonium contaminations.
Future investigations will aim at a comprehensive screening for plu-
tonium containing fuel particles in larger samples and if applicable
detailed investigation of particles by single particle analytical tech-
niques. Detection limits and decision thresholds will be lowered by
use of high purity spikes. Furthermore, a 244Pu spike can be used if no
alpha measurements are performed on the same sample. This can
further improve the performance of AMS on such environmental
samples.
If confirmed, a release of plutonium-rich hot particles is of poten-
tial health concern upon inhalation or incorporation. Our findings
demonstrate the need for more detailed investigations on plutonium
distribution and speciation in order to assess potential radiological
consequences for the public. In any case, our study supports previous
findings that indicated that the environmental plutonium inventory
in Japan has not significantly increased after the Fukushima nuclear
accident.
Methods
Sampling. Samples were taken between October and December 2011 from several
sites on the eastern Japanese coast (Fig. 1). For the sampling in restricted areas
permission was obtained from the mayor of Okuma town. Some of the spots have
already been investigated previously with respect to short-lived c-emitting
radionuclides19 and 90Sr6. Onmost spots two types of samples were taken: top soil and
vegetation (leaves, grass, conifer needles etc.). The sampling sites included highly
contaminated spots such as the gate of the FDNPP (Fukushima I), locations in the
close vicinity of the NPP including Fukushima Daini NPP (Fukushima II), but also
more remote areas such as Yokohama or Kashiwa (some 200 km south of FDNPP).
Exact locations and sampling dates are given in Table 1.
Sample preparation and measurement. All samples were dried at 105uC. All given
specific-activities and masses are referring to the dry mass of the respective sample.
Soil was available in relatively low quantities, ranging typically between 1–2 g, with
the exception of the samplesH-S1 andH-S2, whichwere available in greater amounts.
Hence, we refrained from separating the soil skeleton to avoid additional sample
losses. The samples were ashed with a low heating-up rate over 103 h up to 450uC.
The ash was spiked with about 30 mBq 242Pu and digested using concentrated nitric
acid and concentrated hydrofluoric acid. The dry residue was then taken up in a
solution of 1 M aluminum nitrate and 3 M nitric acid and filtered. The chemical
separation of plutonium was performed by extraction chromatography using
EichromHTEVA resin25. After the separation the sample was transferred to a stainless
steel plate via electrodeposition25,26. The electrodeposition took 2 h at a constant
current of 950 mA. After alpha spectrometry had been conducted, the electrode-
posited material was re-dissolved in hot nitric acid (3 M) from the alpha-plate for
AMS measurement. To optimize the separation from uranium, a second separation
step was applied. Plutonium was subsequently co-precipitated by ferric hydroxide
and converted into ferric oxide by heating up to 800uC25. Finally, the sample was
mixed with aluminum powder in a ratio of 151 and pressed into an AMS target
holder.
Table 1 | Sample descriptions and locations
Type Sample code Location Coordinates
Distance from
FDNPP in km Sampling date
Soil A-S FDNPP Main gate 37u259020N 141u019290E 0.88 2011-12-21
B-S 1.5 km from FDNPP 37u259040N 141u019010E 1.5 2011-12-21
C-S 1.9 km from FDNPP 37u259030N 141u009440E 1.89 2011-12-21
D-S 4.3 km from FDNPP 37u239190N 141u009300E 4.25 2011-12-21
E-S Chimyo-ji temple 37u299450N 141u009050E 8.7 2011-12-21
F-S Fukushima Daini NPP 37u209310N 141u009510E 11.96 2011-12-21
G-S1 Odaka, Minamisoma 37u339570N 141u599310E 16.42 2011-12-21
G-S2 Odaka, Minamisoma 37u339570N 141u599310E 16.42 2011-12-21
H-S1 Minamisoma City 37u389N 140u579E 30 2011-10-31
H-S2 Minamisoma City 37u389N 140u579E 30 2011-10-31
I-S Kashiwa 35u529480N 139u599090E 195 2011-10-26
J-S1 Yokohama 35u329070N 139u389030E 244 2011-07-25
J-S2 Yokohama 35u329070N 139u389030E 244 2011-07-25
Vegetation A-V FDNPP Main gate 37u259020N 141u019290E 0.88 2011-12-21
B-V 1.5 km from FDNPP 37u259040N 141u019010E 1.5 2011-12-21
C-V 1.9 km from FDNPP 37u259030N 141u009440E 1.89 2011-12-21
D-V 4.3 km from FDNPP 37u239190N 141u009300E 4.25 2011-12-21
E-V Chimyo-ji temple 37u299450N 141u009050E 8.7 2011-12-21
F-V Fukushima Daini NPP 37u209310N 141u009510E 11.96 2011-12-21
G-V Odaka, Minamisoma 37u339570N 141u599310E 16.42 2011-12-21
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Basically the same procedure was applied for plant samples with some slight
changes. The ashing procedure was performed with a heating program over 20 h up
to 600uC. We could not perform alpha-spectrometric measurements, due to the very
low sample quantities of 26–230 mg of the sample ash (this fact is referred to as ‘‘N/A’’
(not applicable) in Table 2). For the same reason reduced amounts of only 5 mBq
242Pu were spiked. Furthermore, the digestion procedure was changed to microwave-
pressure-digestion using concentrated nitric (8 mL), hydrochloric (5 mL), and
hydrofluoric acid (2 mL) at 210uC. For the AMS-target, the aluminum powder was
replaced by niobium because recent tests have shown that uranium and plutonium
samples show higher counting rates when dispersed in a niobium matrix.
Accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). The AMS measurement was performed at
the Laboratory of Ion Beam Physics of ETH Zurich, Switzerland, using the compact,
low energy 0.6 MVAMS facility ‘‘Tandy’’27. Over the past few years, the Tandy system
was upgraded with an additional magnet on the high energy side and equipped with
an improved ion source28. Since 2011, helium is used as a stripper gas for all
measurements on the Tandy29. With a transmission of up to 40% for uranium and
thorium29, an abundance sensitivity of up to 10212, and detection limits in the sub-
femtogram range for plutonium isotopes30, the compact (lab-sized) ETHZurich AMS
system Tandy is well suited to detect ultra-trace amounts of actinides.
The setup for plutonium measurements is summarized in ref. 30. Briefly, negative
PuO ions are extracted from the ion source on the low energy side and accelerated by a
terminal voltage of about 300 kV. At the terminal, He stripping is used to destroy any
interferingmolecular ions and Pu31 is selected by themagnetic and electrostatic filters
on the high energy side. Finally, plutonium ions are identified in a dedicated low noise
gas ionization detector31. Generally, different plutonium isotopes are injected and
counted sequentially. The measurement time for each plutonium isotope can be
adjusted before the run according to the expected counting rate of the samples.
In this study, 239Pu and 240Pu were measured for 10 s and 20 s each, while the 242Pu
tracer was counted for 8 s. In addition, the background counting rate on atomic mass
unit (amu) 239 (caused by ‘‘tailing’’ of 238U) was monitored for 5 s on each sample by
injecting 238U16O2 into the accelerator while leaving the high energy side tuned to amu
239. The above sequence was repeated five times (i.e. one pass) before measuring the
next sample. The isotopic ratios of interest were calculated from the average counting
rates acquired during this pass. The whole measurement procedure as described
above was repeated 9 –14 times (passes) for each sample. The final plutonium isotopic
ratios of the samples were calculated from the error weighted mean of all single
measurements (passes). In total, each sample was measured between 35 and 60
minutes.
All plutonium isotopic ratio measurements were normalized to the ETH in-house
plutonium standard ‘‘CNA’’32. Corrections for 238U induced background on amu 239
were below 1% and therefore negligible. The (one sigma) uncertainty of themeasured
240Pu/239Pu ratios was typically 5% for all the soil samples and about 10% for the
vegetation samples. Three vegetation samples, however, revealed relatively low
counting rates on the spike (probably due to low chemical recovery) so that the
uncertainty of these samples was higher (10–20%).
Unfortunately, the 242Pu spike material used in this study also contained significant
amounts of 239Pu and 240Pu so that a correction for spike-supported Pu-isotopes was
necessary. To minimize the uncertainty of this correction 3 and 7 spike samples were
measured together with the soil samples and the vegetation samples, respectively. The
average 239/242 and 240/242 ratios of the spike were used to correct the corres-
ponding isotopic ratios of the samples after each run. The final 240/239 ratios (as
reported in Table 2) were calculated from the spike-corrected 239/242 and 240/242
ratios of the samples. Although several spike samples were averaged, the final (one
sigma) uncertainty of the 240/239 ratio (as given in Table 2) is still dominated by the
propagated uncertainty of the spike correction. For this reason only upper limits can
be reported for most of the 240/239 ratios in Table 2. To avoid this problem in future
studies a cleaner spikematerial has to be used. It would also be advantageous if greater
sample amounts were available in future studies. Alternatively, and if only the ratio
240/239 is of interest, samples can be prepared and measured without the addition of
any spike material.
The above method was validated using IAEA reference materials (IAEA-375,
IAEA-Soil-6, and IAEA-384).
Alpha spectrometry. Alpha-spectrometry was performed using the Canberra Model
7200 Alpha Analyst Integrated Alpha Spectrometer. A passivated implanted planar
silicon (PIPS) detector with an active area of 450 mm2 (Canberra, Model A450-
18AM) was used. The samples were measured for 7 days and the received spectra
evaluated using the software program Genie 2000, Alpha Acquisition & Analysis, V
2.0, Mar2, 2001 from Canberra Industries. The method was validated by IAEA
reference material (IAEA-375, IAEA-Soil-6, and IAEA-384).
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